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ABSTRACT
The main idea behind this article is that in order to understand the 
meaning that Kant’s political philosophy is rendered to by the given 
socio-historical context of a community we need to turn for help to 
artistic genius whose subjective “I” holds a general feeling of the world 
and life. It is in this sense that authors of great novels can help us in two 
ways. First, their works summarise for our imagination artistic truth about 
man’s capacity for humanity, the very thing that Kant considers to be 
the scientifically improvable “fact of reason”. Second, works of great 
writers offer for our insight destinies of individuals who decide to pursue 
moral dictate in a society, thus actualising the potential that lies hidden 
in all of us, making us worthy of respect. As we lack objective scientific 
standard of measurement, artist’s universal feeling of the world is impressed 
upon us through a narrative about a man who, in a given society and in 
a given moment, decides to exercise his autonomy and seek the divine 
in himself. Contemporary social scientists’ attempts to prove historical 
progress is characterised by the very lack of humbleness. Referring to 
the great novelists’ works in this article is aimed to remind scientists of 
restraint and self-control demanded from them by the citizen of Konigsberg.
History as Man’s Moral Progress or an Eternal Search  
for Instruments of Passive Neutralisation of Social Conflict
Kant’s hope for historical progress was inspired by his observation of the French 
Revolution. 
The revolution of a spirited people that we have witnessed in our times may succeed 
or fail. It may be so filled with misery and atrocities that any reasonable person, if he 
could hope, undertaking it a second time, to carry it out successfully, would none-
theless never decide to perform the experiment at such a cost.—Nevertheless, in the 
hearts of all its spectators (who themselves are not involved in the show), I assert, this 
revolution meets with a degree of sympathy in wish that borders on enthusiasm, a 
sympathy the expression of which is itself associated with danger. This sympathy can 
thus have no other cause than a moral capacity in the human race (Kant 2006: 155). 
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One should bear in mind the distinction between being an actor and being a 
spectator, between engaging and judging, which Kant held important (Arendt 1992). 
Being an actor and being a spectator are based on two principles that differ in their 
essence. The principle of action tells the one engaged, and thus incapable of hav-
ing a comprehensive insight into the consequences of one’s actions, that no revo-
lution, albeit one against the worst of tyrants, is justified. Spectator, on the other 
hand, must stay outside the game, impartial. Contrary to actor, spectator must re-
main autonomous in regard to the event. Kant observed affairs in France from the 
standpoint of a distanced spectator making a judgment about the event in a foreign 
country. It made him feel the true pleasure of man in face of a great work of art. “It 
is simply the spectators’ mind-set, which reveals itself publicly in the face of this 
show of large-scale transformations and which makes known such a universal and 
yet unselfish sympathy with the players on the one side against those on the other, 
even at the risk that this partiality could become quite detrimental to them”(Kant 
2006: 155). Convinced that his feelings of sympathy for revolutionaries aroused by 
this historic turmoil is shared among all spectators gifted with good taste, Kant con-
cluded that the significance of the French Revolution lies in the fact that it serves as 
the historical indicator of the “moral tendency of the human race” (Kant 2006:155). 
The world-historic events in France that inspired faith in historical progress in 
Kant were seen as an introduction into a continuous civil war by some other spec-
tators. “Once virtue enters the arena of political action, then the moral dualism 
that, within the framework of the existing State, had guided the indirect assump-
tion of power and made possible an overweening criticism, automatically justifies 
civil war. Civil war is an innocuous occurence. Although it does lead to violence 
and murder, it is none the less shaped by political criticism” (Koselleck 1988: 180). 
Instead of Catholics and Protestants, today’s civil war actors are liberals, social-
ists, conservatives, nationalists, social-democrats who have been provided with an 
excuse to assert their views of the world, politics and society upon the rest of the 
community by the outcome of the Revolution. As opposed to the war led by those 
participating in the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre on the 1572 bloody Parisian 
August eve, in the civil war led under the guise of modern democratic state there is 
no blood and violence. Why? Intoxicated by Rousseau’s appealing idea of volonté 
générale the French had decided to get rid of the monarch and destroy the Old Re-
gime’s institutions, but this fact alone did not make them up to the task of making 
an active political decision about their collective destiny (Burke 1910). The Revo-
lution failed to lead the citizenship from the state of self-incurred immaturity, yet 
it paved the way for appearance of new mechanisms for depoliticisation and neu-
tralisation of social conflicts as a substitute for an absolute monarch’s sovereign 
decision. Passive neutralisation of social conflicts is focused on obscuring the issues 
of the source and origin of politics (Schmitt 2005, Schmitt 2007). Memories of the 
emergency, contingency, decision are to be sedated by liberalism, parliamentarism, 
reducing politics to administration, positive laws, ideology, material prosperity 
and civic security. Seen from this spiritual-historical point of view of decisionism, 
Kant’s faith in historic progress is yet another instrument of depoliticisation and 
neutralisation of social conflicts. 
These two opposed positions in regard to the French Revolution rest upon di-
vergent views of man’s nature.
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 Kant speaks of man in different terms (Arendt 1992: 22–27). In his ethics, man 
is a being with an inherent moral law and potentiality of acting in accordance with 
duty. “An action is said to be in accordance with duty only when every thought of 
advantage to be expected from it, every calculation of present or future pleasure 
likely to result from it, indeed every material aim of any other kind, is eliminated 
and only adherence to the universality of the law, which reins in all contingent and 
particular impulses, remains as the sole ground of determination” (Cassirer 1981: 
244). However, when in his political writings he discusses man as part of human-
kind, Kant actually attempts to define conditions that could inspire people to act 
in accordance with the laws of practical reason. Man as part of humankind is seen 
by Kant as selfish, greedy, motivated by increasing material wealth, but at the same 
time possessing a capacity to learn from his own mistakes. “Those always who have 
their dear self before them as the sole focal point of their efforts and who attempt 
to make everything turn on the great axis of selfinterest are the most common, 
and nothing can be more advantageous than this, for these are the most industri-
ous, orderly, and prudent people; they give demeanor and solidity to the whole, 
for even without aiming at it they serve the common good, supply the necessary 
requisites, and provide the foundations over which finer souls can spread beauty 
and harmony” (Kant 2011: 34). As a result of the “unsocial sociability” mechanism, 
this selfish man gifted with reason gradually perfects his institutions whose back-
lash teaches him to distance himself from his self-interest and refine his ambition. 
The notion of man possessing a capability to learn from historical mistakes and 
perfect his social institutions is foreign to those spectators who see French revo-
lutionaries’ enlightened promises as nothing more than a dangerous illusion (De 
Maistre 2006). In the world where the church has lost its monopoly on interpret-
ing the image of the world, there is no one who can tell man’s real nature. On the 
ruins of medieval order grew a world marked by radical lack of meaning. In such a 
world, citizens will never be up to the task of deciding on common issues through 
public discourse. To convince them that the foundations of their communality can 
be determined by everyday plebiscite (Renan 1996) meant letting their ambitions 
run wild, giving them false hope, which always results in eventual violence and dis-
order. Peace and security that absolutistic monarchy once gave them together with 
the freedom to contemplate the issues of good, beautiful and just in the quietude 
of their private sphere is the most that citizens can expect from history. 
Even Kant himself believed that citizens are not to be given the right of active 
re-examination of postulates underlying obedience to the state immediately. “For 
many affairs that serve the interests of the commonwealth a certain mechanism is 
required, by means of which some members of the commonwealth must play only 
a passive role, so that they can be led by the government in the pursuit of pub-
lic ends by means of an artificial unanimity, or at least be kept from undermining 
these ends” (Kant 2006: 19). Should a tax payer publically question his obligation 
to pay the tax, a civil servant challenge the grounds of his superiors’ orders, and 
priests refuse to adhere to church rules, that would certainly jeopardise the order, 
warned cautious Kant. Order must be stable, however, to provide scientists with 
an environment where they can contemplate in peace and present their insights to 
the literary public. This kind of freedom that Kant calls the “public use of reason” 
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must not be limited in any way. It is preconditioned by peace based on civil obe-
dience to sovereign’s orders (Ciaran 2003). And vice versa, the unlimited public 
use of reason is necessary so that the decisions of those who decide upon common 
good would gradually grow to result in such reform of social institutions that would 
be aimed at actualisation of republican ideals. Refinement of political institutions 
will be followed by a development of civic ability to decide upon common inter-
est issues in the spirit of republicanism. Over time, man will learn to observe the 
problems of communal living independent of his confession-, class-, profession- or 
nation-specific interests. Man’s state of not being engaged in the game will extend 
to envelop more domains of social life and spill over to wider and wider commu-
nities. Thus, the idea of humankind, present in each one of us, will gradually be-
come the principle not only of our judgements but of our actions as well, and actor 
and spectator will become united (Ardent 1992: 75). 
Today’s authors who have given credence to Kant’s vision of nearing eternal 
peace point to empirical indicators of historical progress. “Liberal democracies – the 
political systems we have are closest to Kant’s republics – are wealthy and peace-
ful (at least towards one another). International organizations (global and regional) 
have been developed and play a role that was unthinkable in Kant’s time. A culture 
of human rights is rapidly taking hold of the global community. These may not be 
good enough ‘signs’ of the direction in which we are moving for the sceptic, but 
it is quite likely more than Kant himself would have hoped for two centuries ago” 
(Caranti 2017: 230). Others, however, who have conjoined Kant in his belief that 
the principles of democracy and human rights are so attractive that ultimately no 
people will be able to resist the temptation, have reached completely different con-
clusions by observing legal and political tendencies of our time (Maus 2015). They 
warn of the changes that constitutional democracies and international organisa-
tions are going through in the globalised world, showing features of historical ret-
rogression and deviation from the path delineated by Kant in his political writings. 
Instead of deciding which of the two opposing positions to embrace, this article 
questions the very grounds of attempting to measure historical progress scientifi-
cally. It is erroneous to expect objective empirical proof of humankind’s progress 
from social scientists as they are not up to this task. Powerless to take a scientifical-
ly unbiased position on this matter, social scientists who in our time seek evidence 
of historical progress often unawares charter their ethics to serving the purpose 
of preserving the existing order, taking on the role of “political moralists”. Kant 
viewed the French Revolution as a great artwork of history. Willingness of people 
to sacrifice their safety, property and lives to translating the ideas of freedom from 
philosophical books into history arouse in him a feeling of sympathy and inspired 
his reveries on eternal peace. On the contrary to this, today’s scientists see em-
pirical evidence of Kant’s dream coming true in proliferation of externally liberal 
features of national and international institutions. 
The main idea behind this article is that in order to understand the meaning 
that Kant’s political philosophy is rendered to by the given socio-historical con-
text of a community we need to turn for help to artistic genius whose subjective 
“I” holds a general feeling of the world and life. “The work of art is something sin-
gular and apart, which is its own basis and has its goal purely within itself, and 
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yet at the same time in it we are presented with a new whole, and a new image of 
reality and of the mental cosmos itself” (Cassirer 1981: 307). It is in this sense that 
authors of great novels can help us in two ways. First, their works summarise for 
our imagination artistic truth about man’s capacity for humanity, the very thing 
that Kant considers to be the scientifically improvable “fact of reason”. Second, 
works of great writers offer for our insight destinies of individuals who decide to 
pursue moral dictate in a society, thus actualising the potential that lies hidden in 
all of us, making us worthy of respect. As we lack objective scientific standard of 
measurement, artist’s universal feeling of the world is impressed upon us through 
a narrative about a man who, in a given society and in a given moment, decides 
to exercise his autonomy and seek the divine in himself thus becoming “qualified 
members, or, perhaps more modestly, qualified applicants to another kingdom” 
(Caranti 2017: 27). Can society accept such a member? Does history really change 
in this respect at all? 
In the works of artists belonging to different times and societies we find con-
clusions that are contradictory to those arrived at by today’s social scientists lost 
in their quest for objective indicators of historical progress. Writers of great novels 
tell us that society cannot tolerate an individual who decides to act in accordance 
with duty or questions with his reason the social norms, laws and customs built 
into the foundations of the existing order. To defend its rules, society banishes or 
condemns to a tragic end the one who dares to choose the freedom to seek mean-
ing despite grave consequences of his decisions. Great novelists manage to recog-
nise Kant’s philosophical idea of human nature that contains the kernel of potential 
for a meaningful development towards laws of freedom in the concrete, individual 
and particular. Hence their recurring rebellion against society that denies to man 
of their era a possibility to achieve humanity, reducing him to the banal, empirical, 
earthly, immersed in calculating the costs and benefits of his acts. 
Artistic genius reports with sorrow that history so far confirms the insights of 
philosophers belonging to the spiritual-historical sphere of decisionism. In the 
civil society whose foundations were set in the late 18th century by the French and 
American Revolutions, man has failed to polish the facets of his ambitions against 
historical mistakes. Stability in modern states survives as long as citizens, lulled by 
economic prosperity and semblance of constitutional democracy, cheerfully accept 
the condition of self-inflicted immaturity and witlessly adapt to the existing social 
norms. Yet, when loss of civil security and material wealth shake them awake from 
the state of passive apathy forcing them to pose the question of political power’s 
source and origin, violence, chaos and non-order of the natural condition return 
to the stage once again. 
On Curability of Human Contingency 
“Is there a remedy for the contingent state of man? Is his life incurably accidental, 
as Lucretius thought and as existentialists maintain today, or has man, despite his 
duality, preserved some discoverable link with non-accidental and non-contingent 
Being, so that he may entertain a hope for self-identification? Or, in other terms, is 
he summoned or destined to return a state of completeness and non-contingency?” 
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(Kolakowski 1978:12–13) This question has been nagging at philosophers since 
time immemorial. Philosophical trouble is rooted in the assumption, hope, faith, 
that man is not what meets the eye, that there is more to him than merely his ba-
nal empirical existence. It is a faith that there is something in man that can elevate 
him to divine heights. 
The transition from medieval to modern epoch was accompanied by a triumph 
of the idea that man is the sole creator of what he is to become in this world. The 
idea that man is “the molder and maker of thyself; thou mayest sculpt thyself into 
whatever shape thou dost prefer” (Mirandola 1998: 5) has exited humanistic think-
er Pico della Mirandola. It is the fact that God left it to man to choose his own ap-
pearance and gifts for his adornment that makes man admirable. This Adam who 
can choose to crawl the earth like an animal or become a philosopher, even “a di-
vinity clothed with human flesh” (Mirandola 1998: 6), for Mirandola is a miracle. 
The human capacity to determine his own unsteady, changeable and varied na-
ture is the foundation of man’s dignity. “The seeds that each man cultivates will 
grow and bear their fruit in him. If he cultivates vegetable seeds, he will become 
a plant. If the seeds of sensation, he will grow into brute. If rational, he will come 
out a heavenly animal. If intellectual, he will be an angel, and a son of God. And 
if he is not contented with the lot of any creature but takes himself up into the 
center of his own unity, then, made one spirit with God and settled in the solitary 
darkness of the Father, who is above all things, he will stand ahead of all things” 
(Mirandola 1998: 5). 
Kant spent his philosophical life seeking the answer to the question of what man 
can know (Kant 1998). The quest led him to conclude that contingency of human 
existence is impossible to overcome. Cognition cannot overcome the inexplicable 
experientiality of facts, we can merely acknowledge it, it is a given. Any attempt at 
enveloping wholeness of the world with thinking unavoidably leads to antinomies 
of the mind. Nonetheless, at the same time, man cannot resist thinking about that 
which is in the focus of his interest, yet incomprehensible – about God, freedom 
and the immortal quality of soul. Hence, for Kant these ideas become the unat-
tainable limit that must be the goal of our ambitions. They point to where the end-
less road of self-development that man treads in search of the divine in him leads 
to. “Kant opens a new chapter in the history of philosophy’s attempt to overcome 
the contingency of human existence, setting up freedom as man’s realization and 
establishing the independence of the autonomous reason and will as the ultimate 
goal of man’s unending pilgrimage towards himself, a self that will then be divine” 
(Kolakowski 1978: 50).
Unwillingness to accept the banal contingency of human condition will deter-
mine the direction and result of the search for an idea, which would, following in 
the footsteps of Mirandola and Kant, provide a philosophical justification of at-
tachment to human rights in today’s world (Caranti 2017: 57–104). Endeavour to 
provide a firm base for human rights in the notion of human dignity have resulted 
in shifting the discussion from the field of geopolitics and legal positivism to the 
field of philosophy, which is its greatest merit. Human rights are protected by the 
existing national and international treaties because of the overwhelming conviction 
that humans have dignity. “We assume that one of the major tasks of philosophy, 
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applied to the tricky field of human rights, is the attempt to spell out what lies be-
hind the intuition – taken for granted in all major human rights treaties – that hu-
mans have dignity” (Caranti 2017: 62). Although inspired by the work of the great 
humanistic thinker, for the new concept of dignity Mirandola’s proposition that it 
is his chameleon-like nature that earns man his respectability is insufficient. Man 
deserves his rights to be protected not because he is left with an ability to choose 
his own life path, but because moral decision is always close at his hand regardless 
of the circumstances surrounding him (Caranti 2017: 61). Man is a being worthy of 
dignity due to his capacity to “silence all natural impulses, even the strongest in-
stincts of survival, and act from our conception of duty” (Caranti 2017: 57). 
 Such foundation of human rights is inspired by Kant, yet it is not Kant’s. In-
deed, the novelty in comparison to Kant introduced by this attempt is that duty 
does not necessarily result from the too strict and rigid categorical imperative, but 
from a version of moral law. “For example, one may believe that morality’s source 
is in Good and still adhere to divine commands not out of fear of divine punish-
ment or similarly heteronomous motives, but because one endorses those com-
mands and makes them truly one’s own” (Caranti 2017: 64). What is important is 
man’s cognition that we have a certain commission, absolutely independent from 
what this commission can do for our lives. Man’s capacity to act following dictates 
of duty is the very thing that comprises dignity. It is the thing that makes human 
beings worthy of respect. 
In Search of an Artistic Proof of Man’s Capacity  
to Find the Divine in Himself
What links the philosophical attempt to provide foundations for human rights in 
today’s world with Mirandolo and Kant is the belief that in man lies a hidden pur-
pose, whose actualisation can lead him to the point where the individual and the 
universal, freedom and necessity, reconcile. “The true philosopher does not accept 
the conditions under which life has been given to man” (Arendt 1992: 22). Besides 
philosophers, this feeling of human purpose is also ingrained in artists, authors of 
great novels included. 
The transition from the epoch of epic into the modern epoch of novel was made 
at the moment when the medieval worldview, which maintained that human evil 
nature was determined by the original sin, crumbled. “The novel is the epic of an 
age in which the extensive totality of life is no longer directly given, in which the 
immanence of meaning in life has become a problem, yet which still thinks in terms 
of totality.” (Lukacs 1971: 56) Man who, hoping for redemption and earning his place 
in heaven, lives in compliance with external dictates of the church was replaced by 
Mirandola’s chameleon with an inner potential for both divine and animalistic. It 
was only this kind of man that could become a hero of novel. Writers are not in-
terested in the banal kinds who, out of habit, fear or indifferent dullness, submit 
to small-town rules of living, whose predictable lives can be subsumed under the 
laws of experiential perception. Novel as a work of art holds “a specific sharpness, 
a gravity all its own, in face of which nothing that is merely lifelike--which is to say 
nothing that is dramatically trivial--can survive” (Lukacs 1971: 57).
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 Artistic genius is inhabited by a spiritual archetype, a subjective feeling of pur-
posefulness against which experiential facts of the world are formed. Kant’s work 
demonstrates that it is impossible to envelop the wholeness of the world experi-
ence scientifically, with theoretical mind, by thinking. At the same time his insight 
reveals that artistic genius is gifted with the capacity to bring forth the principle of 
historical development upon which the entirety of nature rests in the singular and 
the particular (Kant 2000: 187–197). “Genius is the talent (natural gift) that gives 
the rule to art. Since the talent, as an inborn productive faculty of the artist, itself 
belongs to nature, this could also be expressed thus: Genius is the inborn predis-
position of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art” (Kant 
2000:186). Therefore, art is quite a special kind of connecting singular with the 
whole. Artist’s talent enables him to find the way to present fruits of his imagina-
tion to all people who are given the gift of good taste. When man finds himself in 
front of a work of artistic genius he remains within his own self but feels at the 
same time relieved from all contingency, as an agent of a universal feeling. Thus, 
artistic genius manages to capture the very thing that eludes scientist. Artist suc-
ceeds in revealing the secret and the power of “universal communicability” thus 
conveying to spectators his intuition of the wholeness of the world, encapsulating 
it and feeding it to our imagination. “Genius and its act stand at the point where 
supreme individuality and supreme universality, freedom and necessity, pure cre-
ation and pure lawfulness indissolubly coalesce” (Cassirer 1981: 321). 
This article inspired by the philosophical attempt to position the notion of dig-
nity in the core of human rights could not feature any random writer, but the one 
who matches Kant’s definition of genius, Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy. This literary 
great wrote the novel “Resurrection” (Voskreséniye, 1899). It is a book about the 
nobleman Nekhlyudov, who lazily gets up from his bed, listlessly washes his face 
in his luxurious bathroom, puts on his elegant clothes with boredom, and reads, 
with resigned contempt, a letter from a wealthy countess who wants to lure him 
into a promise of marriage. His spirit, weary of meaninglessness of living, remains 
insensitive to joys of the beautiful spring day while leaving for the court, in bad 
humour, where he is called to serve as a juror in a hearing of a prostitute who is 
accused of murdering a brutish patron of hers. 
However, once he sees the face of the wretched girl, the soul of the lazy noble-
man disappointed with life is shaken from the very bottom. He recognises the girl 
who used to work on his aunt’s estate and whom he, a handsome wealthy young 
lord, seduced and took before leaving to go to the army once upon the time. The 
unfortunate accused Maslova was left with a child after that night, losing the child 
to illness, while her life went astray, landing her in brothel where she was brutal-
ised by miserable men of various ages and affinities, until the moment when she 
fell a victim of deceit and, unaware of what she was doing, poisoned a patron, 
consequently ending up in prison accused of a cruel murder. The revelation of the 
woman’s sad destiny removes the layers of selfishness, self-absorbedness, laziness 
and apathy covering Nekhlyudov’s divine sparkle. Suddenly he catches a glimpse 
of something beautiful in his own self. The decision to help poor Maslova leads 
him more and more to become aware of the light still simmering within. He gives 
a fortune on lawyers, does his best to keep her out of prison; the fact that she is 
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just disdainfully repulsed by him does not deter him from his intention to follow 
her to Siberia to help her, tend to her, protect her... In the inhumane conditions of 
prison life, far away from society and its banal rules, Nekhlydov manages to reach 
the heights of the divine in himself. 
On the Republic yet to Be Created 
So, Mirandola, Kant and Tolstoy believe that man has the capacity of making a mor-
al decision. This conviction serves as the basis of philosophical attempt to found 
human rights on man’s dignity. We are assured of the existence of that which is 
improvable, not the subject of scientific knowledge, by philosophers and Tolstoy 
in different ways. Awareness of the fact that every one of us possesses “an ines-
capable authority of the moral law” (Caranti 2017: 82) for Kant is a “fact of rea-
son”. Would we be capable of doing the right thing if monarch forced us by a death 
threat to give false testimony against an innocent man? The answer to this ques-
tion is impossible to give beforehand, but what Kant finds certain is that each one 
of us would know what the right thing to do is and that it could be done (Caranti 
2017: 82). This thought experiment is not a scientific proof, as there is no proof 
that moral decision is close at hand to each one of us in all situations. Yet, Tolstoy 
tells us in “Resurrection”, by his ability to impress the universal view of man and 
society upon our imagination intuited by his subjective feeling of the world, that 
the basic proposition of Kant’s ethics is no illusion after all. 
At first sight, however, it can appear that Kant and Tolstoy arrive at different 
conclusions about the conditions necessary for man’s pursuit of freedom. The so-
ciety that Tolstoy knows, the society of banal conventions, hypocrisy and bore-
dom, just buries ever deeper Good’s light given to him at birth. “The aimlessness 
and insubstantiality of the life he describes expresses itself not only objectively, 
for the reader who recognises it, not only as the lived experience of gradual dis-
appointment, but also as an a-prioristic, established, agitated emptiness, a restless 
ennui” (Lukacs 1978:149). Nekhlyudov gains his dignity in the train to Siberia, trav-
elling together with prisoners convicted for the most serious crimes. Can people 
who have buried their light deep inside, who, unlike children, birds and insects, 
are incapable of recognising the beauty of a spring day, judge, punish and impris-
on each other according to their own laws at all without causing an even greater 
evil? In War and Peace (Voyná i mir, 1869), Bolkonsky discovers the truth about the 
beauty of the world mortally wounded on the battlefield, while hungry and bare-
foot Pierre Bezukhov finds it in the image of the simple peasant Platon Karataev 
in prison. Tolstoy’s man succeeds to find humanity only by escaping the world of 
conventions, society and culture. 
As opposed to Tolstoy, Kant and his interpreters today believe that peace and 
stability of civil society offer encouragement for a gradual moral perfection of 
people. However, one must exercise caution here. Kant does not claim that man 
can act in accordance with duty only in a certain civil society. Quite on the con-
trary, Kant and his philosophical disciples maintain that each man in every situ-
ation can find humanity in himself by following the categorical imperative. Even 
in inhumane circumstances, man still has the freedom to use his reason and make 
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a decision independent of the direct or indirect interests. “An individual can be 
autonomous even if she is deprived of external freedom. Think of the case of a 
slave” (Caranti 2017:30). Thus, the difference between the great philosopher and 
genius writer lies not in their divergent understanding of the society and man of 
the time they lived in. On the one hand Tolstoy says: the society I know does not 
encourage man to perfect his nisus. Moreover, this society eradicates humanity 
in man. The decision following the dictates of duty unavoidably means an escape 
from society, rejection of culture and return to nature, harmony, consonance and 
simplicity. On the other hand, Kant argues in his political writings that society is 
capable of changing, developing, of perfecting its institutions. With history’s ad-
vancement towards actualisation of the ideals of the republic, society will generate 
more and more impetuses for actualisation of human potentials. In other words, 
writers speak of a specific society in a specific moment. Reflecting on specific in 
them spawns subjective feeling of the universal. Therefore, it would be wrong to 
wonder which one is right – Kant or Tolstoy.1 Kant writes about a republic that is 
yet to appear. The philosopher writes about a process, a journey. From novelists 
writing in different epochs we can learn how far we have gone on this journey. Kant 
tells us how far we could go. 
The hope of the moral progress of humankind has informed the political writ-
ings of Köngisberg-based philosopher. At the beginning there are just republican 
institutions that keep in check the destructive passions of individuals. In order to 
establish such institutions no moral transformation of people is necessary. Insti-
tutions that set selfish desires, interests and attitudes of individuals against one 
another, preventing them to take over the place of public good, would be suited 
equally to the devil’s people. A bad man establishes a state and becomes a good 
citizen after that. Moreover, perhaps human selfishness and pursuit of self-interest 
is necessary for creating a base one day “over which finer souls can spread beauty 
and harmony” (Kant 2011: 34). 
Nevertheless, as opposed to the American Founding Fathers, who held that 
man’s selfishness and egocentrism are ineradicable, Kant proposes a possibility of 
moral perfection of men. In civil society individuals gradually perfect their ambi-
tions. “The justice of institutions gradually permeates individuals’ souls, and they 
in turn adhere more authentically and steadily to the principles on which their 
government is based, thereby generating further institutional progress” (Caranti 
2017: 126). Citizens gradually come to learn to distance themselves from their own 
self-interest and view problems through the eyes of others. When war disasters and 
suffering finally teach entire nations to see problems through the eyes of others, 
they enter into agreements and gradually transition into the state of eternal peace, 
preserving their republican institutions. 
Like freedom, Kant’s republic is indeed an ideal to be constantly sought but 
never completely attained. “No existing republic can be satisfied with the level of 
normative and institutional development achieved” (Caranti 2017: 201). The same 
goes for the idea of citizen. To be a citizen in Kant’s republic means to be able to 
distance ourselves from our own interests and implies a high level of freedom from 
indirect and direct pressures. Kant’s citizen is the one in whom actor engaged in the 
1 I am thankful to Caranti for this important suggestion.
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game and unengaged spectator coalesce, the one who feels at home in the world. 
They are still non-existent in the empirical reality of Kant’s time. Man’s lifespan is 
too short to actualise all of his potentials. A full development of the seeds planted 
in man by nature can be achieved only at the end of the historical road delineated 
by Kant in his essay “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspec-
tive” (Kant 2006: 3-16). In it, Kant attempts to reveal natural purpose in the sense-
less current of human reality. 
Hannah Arendt notices a tone of irony in Kant’s political writings, drawing the 
conclusion that Kant himself did not take them too seriously (Arendt 1992: 7). She 
reminds us of the fact that Kant called the most important among them, Perpetual 
Peace, “reveries” (Arendt 1992: 7). The German philosopher discovered significance 
of the political as distinguished from the social rather late in life, when he was woken 
from his snooze by the French and American Revolutions. Therefore, his political 
writings should be understood more like “play with ideas” or “mere pleasure trip” 
(Arendt 1992: 7) than as serious theses that the social science of the future is to prove. 
Today’s philosophers dedicated to study of Kant’s political thought disagree with 
that (Caranti 2017: 207-256). What our time requires is to clean Kant’s plan of the 
human history’s development from dogmatic deposits. Once this is done, revealed 
before us will be the reasons why “non-linear progress towards the cosmopolitan 
constitution, rather than regress or stagnation, is the most likely development of 
human affairs” (Caranti 2017: 210). This thesis rests upon the faith that people are 
relatively benevolent and capable of learning from experience over time to under-
stand their true interests. Owing to the mechanism of “unsocial sociability” peo-
ple will, in time, learn lessons from their social conflicts, which will force them to 
reform their national and supranational institutions towards actualisation of the 
republic and eternal peace. Does the expansion of institutions of representative 
democracy and strengthening of the international institutions’ power truly mean 
that humankind has progressed and that citizens have learned their lessons from 
wars, misery and conflicts? Is Carl Schmitt right when he argues that institutions 
of liberal democracy are instruments of passive neutralisation of social conflicts 
that can only postpone, more or less, the return of chaos, violence and wars on the 
stage of history? Do peace and stability in civil society, contrary to what Kant and 
those who continue in his footpath today think, require an individual in the state of 
self-inflicted immaturity, blind adherence to the decisions of authorities, national 
narrow-mindedness and lack of interest in the world problems? Do we still live in 
the same civil society whose artistic truth was offered to us by Tolstoy, a society 
that does not encourage but discourage people’s actualistion of their human poten-
tials? Who should we believe? Where to look for conffirmation of Kant’s theses?
A Search for Objective Evidence of History’s Progress  
– Science in the Service of Preserving Order
By positioning freedom as a fundamental principle, while eternal peace as a duty 
derived from this principle, Kant presented all future interpreters of historical 
progress with a conundrum. For Kant republic and peace go hand in hand. Inter-
nally ordered form of government and peace are equally important. Until both 
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legally needed elements, peace and freedom, are united, the solution is not found 
(Maus 2015).
The main problem with the authors engaged in theory of democratic peace is 
the fact that they have tried to simplify Kant’s conundrum in such a way to en-
able empirical measurement of speed on the road of historical progress. Those 
contemporary authors who can be credited with rerailing the debate back to the 
field of philosophy, show where even the best of democratic peace theorists have 
failed in their ambitious attempt to empirically confirm the thesis that democra-
cies never engage in war between each other (Caranti 2017: 177–181). They always 
miss something in their attempts to measure the degree of human history’s prog-
ress. So, instead of objective scientific insights, their works too often feature an 
arbitrary subordination to the ruling ideology and servicing interests of the most 
powerful world’s state. 
It must, however, be admitted that our time poses a very difficult task before 
those researchers who dare make the claim that history is on the track of finding a 
solution to Kant’s conundrum. This includes references to strengthening of inter-
national organisations and declarative advocacy of democracy and human rights 
all over the world as empirical evidence of Kant’s “reveries” turning into historical 
reality. We live in the time of illusions. Observed from the outside, liberal democ-
racies are truly scattered all over the world. But liberal democracy’s institutions are 
almost everywhere devoid of their fundamental philosophical and historical sense. 
Kant’s hope for actualisation of republican ideal was sparked under a great in-
fluence of the revolutions in France and the USA that marked the historical mo-
ment in which he was writing his political texts. American and French constitu-
tions yielded by the two revolutions rely on two essentially different principles of 
freedom (Arendt 1973). Kant criticised the American Constitution, which reflects 
the Founding Fathers’ distrust of the people and democracy. Convinced that the 
existing American States provide a better framework for the appearance of the fu-
ture republic than a large federal state where the will of the sovereign people is 
structurally limited, the German philosopher sided with the antifederalists (Maus 
2015: 77). History would validate the claim showing that the American demos has 
only on rare and exceptional “constitutional moments” – such as the 1861-65 civ-
il war and the 1930s New Deal reforms – managed to leave the Madison’s feder-
al prison to reach an autonomous decision on their collective destiny. Moreover, 
American historical experience speaks of a constant progress in finding original 
constitutional and political mechanisms that will leave the population in a perma-
nent state of dull passivity in regard to public affairs (Wolin 2008). To spectator 
not engaged in the game today’s world where the American model of democracy 
and human rights is externally imposed upon other countries by military interven-
tions, can hardly seem to be coming closer to Kant’s ideal of putting eternal peace 
in service of freedom. 
Kant pinned more hopes on the promise of freedom given on the ruins of the 
French Revolution than on the federal Constitution of the USA. Experts on his 
thought claim that for Kant there was only one republic, and it was the French Re-
public (Maus 2015: 78). How far has Europe gone in actualising republican prin-
ciples announced by the Revolution? It is important here to bear in mind that for 
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Kant, states were the only true guardians of the place where the future republic 
was to appear. State sovereignty is to be maintained at all costs for its very capaci-
ty to one day become people’s sovereignty. On the one hand, European states built 
into their constitutions the principles of the French Revolution, while engaging in 
wars for territories, supremacy, resources, on the other. For many of today’s spec-
tators, the peace guaranteed by the European Union is a proof of Europeans’ ca-
pacity to learn from their historical mistakes and gradually come closer to actual-
ising Kant’s ideal. Their mistakes lie in the fact that they have left out from Kant’s 
eternal peace formula the key element of freedom. The fundamental belief of the 
French revolutionaries that each authority must have its source and origin in the 
people is almost completely forgotten in Europe today. Peace in Europe today re-
sults from the process of putting democracy under control, stripping it of mean-
ing and neutralising it. 
The existential crises that hit the EU after the soaring of the member states’ 
debts in 2009 offered to spectators an opportunity to grasp the idea underpinning 
the European integration (Kovacevic 2017). As it turned out, integration represents 
a “hidden technocratic revolution” depleting the states’ democracies of more and 
more decisions without transferring the framework for actualising the republican 
principle to the European level. Despite peace, human rights and institutions of 
representative democracy at national and European levels, dull apathy has nested 
in the souls and minds of European countries’ citizenry instead of republican ideals. 
Lulled in material prosperity and safety the member states’ citizens have indiffer-
ently accepted cancellation of the possibility of social learning and self-enlighten-
ment. It has been done by politicians, governments, courts, the European Commis-
sion, Court of Justice, social scientists, whom Monnet’s artful method of integration 
put into service of actualising revolutionary goals of Europe’s political unity and 
creation of a governing system that will structurally separate the will of the people 
from the decision-making processes. Thus, over time, the European integration 
process disarmed all the potential guardians of state sovereignty, bringing crum-
bling down the only framework for the appearance of the future republic available 
so far. The peace in Europe where the republican principle has been sacrificed for 
the sake of prosperity and security today resonates with the silence of a graveyard. 
Great Novels in The Service of Measuring the Speed of Progress  
on the Historical Road to Moral Perfection of Men
Revealing contradictions and misconceptions in the works of today’s social scien-
tists seeking empirical evidence of the historical progress are insufficient in solving 
the dilemma whether the hope of moral perfection of humankind and improvement 
of social institutions is justified. Are social scientists up to the task of finding the 
answer to this question at all? 
A negative answer to the latter question was suggested by Kant himself. The one 
who would attempt to offer a scientific proof that social conditions for the devel-
opment of human potentials have been improved would have to envelop the en-
tirety of historical experience. That would unavoidably lead into to the labyrinth 
of commeasuring causes and consequences from which it is impossible to find a 
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way out by applying cognitive processes. The notion of the entirety of experience 
is scientifically unattainable, showed Kant with conviction. For this reason, we 
suggest, following in the footsteps of what the German philosopher wrote in The 
Critique of Judgment about the problem of reconciling the beautiful and the tele-
ological, to seek the measure of historical progress in works of artists. More accu-
rately, in the novels of great writers who wrote what the time and society they lived 
in whispered into their ears about the relationship between an individual and order. 
A writer seeks neither evidence nor unbiased objectivity. Artistic feeling is an 
“I”-feeling. But it is this very “I” that holds the universal feeling of the world and 
life. It seems that this artistic feeling always tells the same: society cannot toler-
ate an individual who defies its banal conventions and sets off on an autonomous 
search of meaning and dignity. For this, he is doomed to exile, excommunication, 
misery, tragic death. Such a destiny, which befell Socrates, Hegel found justified. 
“The spirit of this people in itself, its constitution, its whole life, rested, however, 
on a moral ground, on religion, and could not exist without this absolutely secure 
basis. Thus because Socrates makes the truth rest on the judgment of inward con-
sciousness, he enters upon a struggle with the Athenian people as to what is right 
and true. His accusation was therefore just, and we have to consider this accusa-
tion as also the end of his career” (Hegel 1892: 426). By dooming to failure those 
who question its customs, beliefs, value system, society has been trying to defend 
its boring order since antiquity. 
The artistic truth about the Athenian society that condemned Socrates to his 
tragic end was conveyed to us by Euripides in his tragedies. This society cannot 
stand Hippolytus who, staying true to this oath of preserving his chastity, refuses 
to accept manly and sovereign duties imposed on him by the society (Hippolytos, 
428 BC). Having acted in accordance with the feeling of his inner duty, heedless 
of consequences, he makes a moral decision to keep quiet and preserve honour of 
Phaedra, his father’s wife who was inspired by Aphrodite to fall in love with her 
stepson in order to exact vengeance on Hippolytus who denies her worship refus-
ing to transition from the world of boyish innocence into the world of adult men. 
Making his horrible death under the hooves of frightened horses inevitable in the 
sequence of events, Euripides’ artistic genius offers us the truth of his times about 
the relationship between polis and an individual who decides to defy its rules. 
Centuries after Euripides’ tragedy had been written, the malign excommunica-
tion would be the destiny of Moliere’s Misanthrope, too (Le Misanthrope ou l’Atra-
bilaire amoureux, 1666). Refusing to accept hypocrisy, banality and superficiality 
of Parisian society, Alceste engages into a conflict with the monarchist society, re-
fusing to succumb to its “honnête homme” norm. The society, which finds Alceste’s 
ridiculing and subversion of banal norms of behaviour and human relationships 
dangerous for its survival, exiles and dooms to miserable loneliness this rigid moral 
puritan, who refuses to “silently adopt the spirit of the time”. Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
(Hamlet, 1602) will share Hippolytus and Alceste’s destiny. The bitter rebellion of 
the Danish prince against the society founded on hypocrisy, lies and betrayal will 
end once Shakespeare’s hero, unlike Kant, concludes that the world is impossible to 
change and put back on the right track. Hamlet will disdainfully reject the maturity 
heralded by such a conclusion and, thus resigned to his fate, go to meet his death. 
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One philosophical interpretation of Dostoyevsky suggests that he foretold a 
historical quake, a creation of a new man, society and world. “He belongs to the 
new world. Only formal analysis of his works can show whether he is already the 
Homer or the Dante of that world or whether he merely supplies the songs which, 
together with the songs of other forerunners, later artists will one day weave into 
a great unity: whether he is merely a beginning or already a completion” (Lukacz 
1971: 152-153). If the Russian literary genius is observed from this point of view, 
similarity between the protagonist of his The Idiot (Idiot, 1869), Prince Myshkin, 
and Socrates comes as no surprise. Socrates’ enquiry of the beautiful, the virtu-
ous and the good, coupled with encouraging an unbound curiosity in the youth, 
jeopardised the foundations of his Athens’ order. Myshkin’s truthfulness of an in-
nocent child will wrack chaos with the souls and minds of the members of the so-
ciety whose artistic truth is delivered by Dostoyevsky. Myshkin’s presence alone, 
his child-like questions and goodness help people to recognise, if only for a mo-
ment, the divine, the light, the spark lying hidden under the layers of hypocritical 
and rotten society, the very spark that Tolstoy’s Nekhlyudov finds on the train to 
Siberia. Myshkin’s boyish spirit, however, at the same time stirs the selfish, banal, 
passion-blinded and the vengeful that the existing social customs and rules inspire 
in man. Perhaps Dostoyevsky was truly a man of the coming age, but his answer to 
the question of the relationship between an individual and order was the same as 
Euripides’, Moliere’s and Shakespeare’s. Defending the order, the narrow-mind-
ed society eventually dooms Myshkin to lunacy and sends him back to the same 
Swiss sanatorium for mental patients from which a train brought him to Russia at 
the beginning of the novel. 
German experience holds special importance for testing Kant’s vision of the 
moral progress of humankind that learns from horrible war experiences. 
 So, in his novel The Tin Drum (Die Blechtrommel, 1959), Gunter Grass writes 
about a boy who refuses to grow up and starts to speak in order to avoid engaging 
in the world of adults and sinking into brutality of World War II. 
Heinrich Boll has left to the world a book about a lonely clown who roams the 
trains and towns of post-war Germany (Ansichten eines Clowns, 1963). This twenty-
seven-year-old boy from Bonn is haunted by a clear memory of his mother’s voice 
passionately telling her children at the dinner table: “everyone must do his bit to 
drive the Jewish Yankees from our sacred German soil!” Haunted by this voice, he 
tries to escape the society in which this same woman has come to preside over the 
Executive Committee of the Societies for the Reconciliation of Racial Differences 
and regularly goes to the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam. Boll’s clown remains 
a pure and innocent boy who refuses to engage in the hypocritical world of adults 
showing its face from the war ruins of Germany. Perhaps this hypocrisy is neces-
sary for modern society to function at all, for people to enjoy security and mate-
rial prosperity. Perhaps hypocrisy is a necessary element of the passive neutrali-
sation of social conflicts written about by Carl Schmitt. In such a society, there is 
no place for Boll’s hero. He remains a lost clown who performs his sad act about 
coming and going at railway stations. 
In his books, Peter Handke roams alone the gloomy global society of today 
searching in people’s eyes for a spark that testifies to the existence of human 
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potential for the beautiful and the sublime that Kant and Mirandola pinned their 
hopes on. In his novel The Moravian Night (Die morawische Nacht, 2008), he finds 
it by mere chance in the eyes of a girl reading a book on a bus in Denmark or a 
boy who, holding a ball, stands in the midst of a destroyed cemetery in Kosovo. 
***
The foregoing is not to lead one to conclude that Kant was wrong. It is important 
to understand that Kant’s freedom, republic and citizen are ideals the world con-
stantly comes closer to, yet never reaches. However, these are not ideals detached 
from reality or above it. Kant recognised the grain of purposeful historical prog-
ress in the reality he knew. Therefore, the question is not whether or not Kant was 
right. The question is how to measure how far society has come in cultivating the 
grain of humanity captured by Kant’s philosophical imagination in the world of 
his time. In contrast with today’s social scientists, writers of great novels say from 
their respective epochs: not an inch. 
Social Scientist as a “Political Moralist” 
Kant’s philosophy has always attracted artists whose vivid imagination found in 
it all kinds of inspirations and giving it a plethora of interpretations. Indeed, the 
fate of philosophical ideas is determined by mirrors these ideas will reflect in, re-
gardless of the protests of philosophical schools or experts for certain thinkers. 
One of the most wonderful mirrors to reflect Kant’s thought was Goethe’s poetic 
soul (Cassirer 1970). The views of the philosophical and poetic geniuses differed 
in many ways. While for Kant the beautiful and the good, genius and scientist, art 
and nature must stay apart, Goethe does not accept a sharp division between sci-
ence and art (Cassirer 1970: 85). Therefore, Kant would perhaps frown upon the 
humble intellectual experiment conducted in this article, which looks for a mea-
sure of historical progress in the works of the great novelists. Goethe might ap-
prove of it. Or he might not. We cannot answer this question with any degree of 
certainty, however disdainful Kant experts might find it. This article, indeed, was 
not aimed at offering yet another in the long series of “correct” interpretations of 
Kant’s political philosophy. The humble aim of the paper was to create yet another 
in the endless series of small mirrors for reflecting the great German philosopher’s 
thought, using history of ideas, political theory and history of literature. 
Kant’s gift that Goethe wholeheartedly embraced is setting limits to that which 
can be grasped by mind. Goethe was grateful to Kant for calling scientists on hu-
mility, warning them not to probe into that which cannot be known. The greatest 
German poet saw Kant’s philosophy as something liberating, something that by 
setting the clear limits on the experiential knowledge clears the field where artistic 
imagination will freely seek the truth. Everything that science is unable to prove is 
left to artistic genius (Cassirer 1970: 78). 
Contemporary social scientists’ attempts to prove historical progress is char-
acterised by the very lack of humbleness. Today’s interpreters of Kant’s thought 
have a task to show them where they are wrong, to remind them of the limits of 
what can be known. Refereeing to the great novelists’ works in this article about 
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Kant was actually aimed to remind scientists of restraint and self-control demand-
ed from them by the citizen of Konigsberg. 
To disagree with the authors who see tendencies of historical progress in to-
day’s world does not mean to reject their understanding of “moral politician” (Ca-
ranti 2017: 235–255). Even if coming closer to the idea of republic and establishing 
the state of eternal peace is accepted, moral politician can contribute to facilitat-
ing the process leading towards attainment of this goal. His task is to carefully 
manipulate facts of the empirical world into compliance with the universal law of 
righteousness. But, to achieve this, it is impossible to follow a scheme, applying 
rules given beforehand to reality. Politics cannot be reduced to science. A politi-
cian’s skill cannot be learned. The world where politics is possible at all cannot be 
a closed and predictable world of given facts combined and recombined follow-
ing the rules derived from scientific observation. “She must be endowed by nature 
with a talent to know how and when scientific and moral norms of various kinds 
are to be applied” (Caranti 2017: 255). It is for this reason that talent, which only 
few are gifted with, is needed for both politics and art. What is needed is imagi-
nation, creativity. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that it is “more likely to meet 
a good man than a good politician” (Caranti 2017: 255), the interpreters of Kant’s 
political philosophy remind us. 
However, they claim that besides talent, a politician needs knowledge, the kind 
of knowledge that the best social science today can give him. “She must have ac-
quired solid and wide knowledge of the empirical laws relevant to her decisions, 
that is potentially all those of the social sciences plus history” (Caranti 2017: 255). 
The question we pose at the end of this article is: Can a social science that sees 
the legal and political tendencies of today’s world as proofs of historical progress 
bring a politician to the right path? 
Amid the European public debt crisis of the early 2010s, two important think-
ers wrote books that attracted great attention. One comes from the world of so-
cial sciences, while the other is a novelist. They are Jurgen Habermas and Michel 
Houllebecq. In Habermas’ book, the systemic crisis that has led to a suspension 
of democracy and collapse of the previous way of life in the countries of Southern 
Europe is just a necessary step on the path towards the development of a republi-
can Constitution of Europe, which is merely an introduction into actualisation of 
Kant’s ideal of a world civil society (Habermas 2012). On the other hand, Houlle-
becq in his Submission (Soumission, 2015) writes about the lost French literature 
professor left without references points that used to be provided to European man 
by profession, religion and family. Terrified by such a freedom of a child left alone 
in the cradle, professor eventually submits to the new worldview offered by Islam 
for the sake of comfort. 
So, the question is who Kant’s “moral politician” is to believe? Habermas, who 
provides the gloomy European reality with a philosophical justification uttering 
the words of comfort: everything is going as planned, exactly as it is supposed to, 
reforms are supposed to be modest and limited in their reach? To Houllebecq, who 
wakes him up from his stupor with a scream and warns: historical regression is at 
work, even the little autonomy and dignity whose respect a European had won 
since the French Revolution in his national state has now vanished; unless you 
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want Europe to slip into dark despotism, something major must be done quickly 
and society radically changed? 
The answer can only be given by a true “moral politician”. A political theorist 
must satisfy himself with an insight that the conclusions of the most influential Eu-
ropean philosopher and artistic truth have found themselves on the warring sides 
in today’s European society. The theorist can claim with certainty that Habermas 
will not share the destiny of Socrates, who brought the constitutional foundations 
of his polis under question with his unbridled and truth-seeking curiosity. The 
theoretician can also conclude that Habermas has ignored Kant’s requirement for 
scientific humbleness in his attempt to find in the development of a supranational 
governing system of the EU scientific indicators of historical progress. The French 
Revolution kindled the spark of the sublime in Kant as an unengaged spectator 
and encouraged him to dream of an eternal peace. The European integration, as a 
hidden revolution, has derailed European nations from the path of gradual self-en-
lightenment and learning through historical experience. It is hard to believe that 
this wearisome process led by technocratic logic can inspire an unengaged spec-
tator to dream of making the idea of freedom true. Sympathies of the unengaged 
spectators might have been awakened for a short while by the rebellion of the citi-
zens from southern states in the height of the public debt crisis (Douzinas 2013). If 
such sympathies really existed, they must have turned into disappointment quickly 
when the Greeks, French, Spanish, Italians and Portuguese were discouraged by 
fears of losing material security from rebellious demands for freedom. Yet, even 
though the European Union does not encourage dreaming of freedom, it has so far 
managed to secure peace. That explains why philosophers who see before their eyes 
the horrors of war suffering from the previous European epochs place their work 
into the service of preserving the present supranational order. The legitimate fear 
of new conflicts on European soil overwhelms their faith that autonomous learning 
and self-enlightenment of Europeans is possible, leaving them with nothing else to 
do but to take upon themselves the role of “political moralists”. 
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Bojan Kovačević
Subjektivna univerzalnost pisaca velikih romana kao umetnička mera 
napredovanja istorije ka ostvarenju Kantove vizije slobode
Apstrakt
Osnovna teza članka jeste da bi za razumevanje smisla koji Kantova politička filozofija zado-
bija u konkretnom društveno-istorijskom kontekstu određene zajednice trebalo iskoristiti 
pomoć genijalnih umetnika u čijem se subjektivnom „ja“ smestilo opšte osećanje sveta i ži-
vota U tom smislu, pisci velikih romana mogu nam pomoći na dva načina. Prvo, njihova dela 
sažimaju za našu uobrazilju umetničku istinu o čovekovom kapacitetu za ljudskost, onome 
što za Kanta predstavlja naučno nedokazivu „činjenicu razuma“. Drugo, u delima velikih pi-
saca možemo posmatrati sudbinu pojedinaca koji u određenom društvu odluče da deluju u 
skladu sa moralnim zakonom, ostvarivši tako mogućnost koja leži u svakome od nas i čini nas 
vrednim poštovanja. U odsustvu objektivnih naučnih merila, umetničko opšte osećanje sve-
ta prenosi nam se kroz priču o čoveku koji u konkretnoj zajednici u određenom vremenu od-
luči da ostvari svoju autonomiju, potraži božansko u sebi. Odsustvo skromnosti ono je što 
odlikuje pokušaje današnjih društvenih naučnika da dokažu istorijski progres. Pozivanje na 
dela pisaca velikih romana u ovom članku o Kantu ima za cilj da opomene naučnike na uzdr-
žanost i samograničavanje koje je od njih zahtevao građanin Kenigsberga. 
Ključne reči: Kant, roman, mir, Tolstoj, genije, nauka, progress, istorija
